Achieving a good clinical trial design increases the likelihood that a trial will take place as planned, including that data will be obtained from a sufficient number of participants, and the total number of participants will be the minimal required to gain the knowledge sought. A good trial design also increases the likelihood that the knowledge sought by the experiment will be forthcoming. Achieving such a design is more than good sense—it is ethically required in experiments when participants are at (...) risk of harm. This paper argues that doing a power analysis effectively contributes to ensuring that a trial design is good. The ethical importance of good trial design has long been recognized for trials in which there is risk of serious harm to participants. However, whether the quality of a trial design, when the risk to participants is only minimal, is an ethical issue is rarely discussed. This paper argues that even in cases when the risk is minimal, the quality of the trial design is an ethical issue, and that this is reflected in the emphasis the Belmont Report places on the importance of the benefit of knowledge gained by society. The paper also argues that good trial design is required for true informed consent. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 1, Page 71-76, March 2012.

_Hume's Naturalism_ provides a clear and concise guide to the debates over whether Hume's empiricism or his 'naturalism' in the tradition of the Scottish 'Common Sense' school of philosophy gained his upper hand. This debate is central to any understanding of Hume's thought. H.O. Mounce presents a beautifully clear guide to Hume's most important works, _The Treatise on Human Nature_ and _Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion_. Accessible to anyone coming to Hume for the first time, _Hume's Naturalism_ affords a much needed (...) overview of the key concepts of empiricism, causation, scepticism, reason and morality that are essential to any understanding of Hume's philosophy. (shrink)

Kendler addresses three basic and interrelated questions that face all psychologists: What is the subject matter of psychology? What are the criteria for understanding psychological events? What ethical principles underlie the use of psychological knowledge? "[The book's] structure.... only hints at the literate and responsible handling of these current issues.... [it] would be enjoyable to use in teaching." --Psychological Report.

A philosophical exploration of the origin and limits of the modern world.

In this dialogue, we discuss the contrast between inexorable physical laws and the semiotic freedom of life. We agree that material and symbolic structures require complementary descriptions, as do the many hierarchical levels of their organizations. We try to clarify our concepts of laws, constraints, rules, symbols, memory, interpreters, and semiotic control. We briefly describe our different personal backgrounds that led us to a biosemiotic approach, and we speculate on the future directions of biosemiotics.

Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value, something associated with understanding, hope, and love, something to be inculcated, maintained, and cherished. On the other hand, for many people, faith is a vice, something associated with dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness, something to be avoided at all costs. The papers included in this special (double) issue on approaches to faith explore (...) questions about faith in a variety of settings through a diverse range of examples, both secular and religious. The attempt to deepen our understanding of faith in the context of ordinary human relationships (e.g., between parents and children, friends, generals and their armies, business partners, citizens and the state), a commitment to ideals, or the pursuit of significant goals is clearly of general philosophical interest, as is the examination of potential connections between faith and topics such as trust or reliance. (shrink)

In this dialogue, we discuss the contrast between inexorable physical laws and the semiotic freedom of life. We agree that material and symbolic structures require complementary descriptions, as do the many hierarchical levels of their organizations. We try to clarify our concepts of laws, constraints, rules, symbols, memory, interpreters, and semiotic control. We briefly describe our different personal backgrounds that led us to a biosemiotic approach, and we speculate on the future directions of biosemiotics.

The relationship between psychology and ethics is determined by whether psychology is conceptualized as a natural or a human science. If the former, then psychology is incapable of identifying universal moral imperatives because of the fact/value dichotomy that rejects the possibility of logically deriving moral principles or social policies from factual statements. In addition, the inevitability of moral pluralism raises the question as to how natural science methodology can select moral truths or social policies from a variety of presumed alternatives. (...) In contrast, human science psychology, which emphasizes phenomenological experience as a source of psychological truths, has attempted to bridge the fact/value gap. Upon close examination, this approach has failed to suggest a rule as to how the "correct" set of values can be identified. The conclusion is that facts cannot dictate moral principles or social policies but they can help illuminate their consequences. Policy decisions become the responsibility of a democratic society, not of psychology. (shrink)

This study considers the role of epistemic turning points in the historiography of sexuality. Disentangling the historical complexity of scientia sexualis, I argue that the late 19th century and the mid-20th century constitute two critical epistemic junctures in the genealogy of sexual liberation, as the notion of free love slowly gave way to the idea of sexual freedom in modern western society. I also explore the value of the Foucauldian approach for the study of the history of sexuality in non-western (...) contexts. Drawing on examples from Republican China (1912—49), I propose that the Foucauldian insight concerning the emergence of a ‘homosexual identity’ in the West can serve as a useful guide for thinking about similar issues in the history of sexuality and the historical epistemology of sexology in modern East Asia. (shrink)

We investigate the connection between interference and computational power within the operationally defined framework of generalised probabilistic theories. To compare the computational abilities of different theories within this framework we show that any theory satisfying four natural physical principles possess a well-defined oracle model. Indeed, we prove a subroutine theorem for oracles in such theories which is a necessary condition for the oracle model to be well-defined. The four principles are: causality, purification, strong symmetry, and informationally consistent composition. Sorkin has (...) defined a hierarchy of conceivable interference behaviours, where the order in the hierarchy corresponds to the number of paths that have an irreducible interaction in a multi-slit experiment. Given our oracle model, we show that if a classical computer requires at least n queries to solve a learning problem, because fewer queries provide no information about the solution, then the corresponding “no-information” lower bound in theories lying at the kth level of Sorkin’s hierarchy is \. This lower bound leaves open the possibility that quantum oracles are less powerful than general probabilistic oracles, although it is not known whether the lower bound is achievable in general. Hence searches for higher-order interference are not only foundationally motivated, but constitute a search for a computational resource that might have power beyond that offered by quantum computation. (shrink)

Democracy and Authenticity examines a basic problem for liberal democracies. In a polity that is characterized by real diversity of identities and values, what kinds of justifications are appropriate for coercive government actions? In particular, this book argues that justifications that are based on particular religious or other doctrines that are not accessible to nonadherents cannot be a proper basis for government actions that affect everyone. Instead, the book develops a model of public justification that is intended to guide citizens (...) in a liberal democracy through the work of creating a politics that satisfies their responsiblities to one another. (shrink)

The 2006 outbreak of E. coli O157:H7, traced to bagged spinach from California, illustrates a number of contradictions. The solutions sought by many politicians and popular food analysts have been to create a centralized federal agency and a uniform set of production standards modeled after those of the animal industry. Such an approach would disproportionately harm smaller-scale producers, whose operations were not responsible for the epidemic, as well as reduce the agroecological diversity that is essential for maintaining healthy human beings (...) and ecosystems. Why should responses that only reinforce the problem be proffered? We use the framework of accumulation and legitimation to suggest corporate and government motives for concealing underlying problems and reinforcing powerful ideologies of individualism, scientism, and centralizing authority. Food safety (or the illusion of safety) is being positioned to secure capital rather than public welfare. We propose implementing the principle of subsidiarity as a more democratic and decentralized alternative. Because full implementation of this principle will be resisted by powerful interests, some promising intermediate steps include peer production or mass collaboration as currently applied to disease prevention and surveillance, as well as studying nascent movements resisting current food safety regulations. (shrink)

Historians and philosophers of science have furnished a wide array of theoretical-historiographical terms to emphasize the discontinuities among different systems of knowledge. Some of the most famous include Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigm”, Michel Foucault’s “episteme”, and the notion of “styles of reasoning” more recently developed by Ian Hacking and Arnold Davidson. This paper takes up this theoretical-historiographical thread by assessing the values and limitations of the notion of “style” for the historical and philosophical study of science. Specifically, reflecting on various methodological (...) and theoretical concerns prompted by sexuality, translation, and East Asian studies, this paper argues that the heretofore ways in which historians and philosophers of science have used the notion of “style” are severely restricted in terms of its mere applicability to the intellectual history of Western science. The particular example of the translation of “homosexuality” into Chinese during the May Fourth era reveals that the notion of “style” has the potential of carrying a much more dynamic conceptual weight, as when used in “styles of argumentation”. The paper also engages briefly with the historiography of scientific “national styles” and ends with some concluding remarks on the limitations of “social histories from below” and the under appreciated importance of “epistemological histories of possibilities”. (shrink)

In previous research Libet discovered that a critical time period for neural activation is necessary in order for a stimulus to become conscious. This necessary time period varies from subject to subject. In this current study, six subjects for whom the time for neural activation of consciousness had been previously determined were administered a battery of psychological tests on the basis of which ratings were made of degree of repressiveness. As hypothesized, repressive subjects had a longer critical time period for (...) neural activation of consciousness, suggesting the possibility that this neurophysiological time factor is a necessary condition for the development of repression. (shrink)

The contemplation of the end of life — life's ending — provokes the emotions of fear, alarm and despondency. Fears about the end of life are almost universal. The Stoic Zeno of Elea first analyzed the problem accurately when he pointed out what he thought the fundamental problems of human existence consisted of. He identified the fundamental anxieties as being fear of the gods and a fear of death. Both fears, he thought, could be therapeutically eliminated: fear of the gods (...) was pointless since they did not care about us, and fear of death could be rationalized away by reasonable philosophical argumentation. Without wishing to resurrect Zeno's arguments, one can safely say that he was spectacularly wrong in his view of the power of rational argument. The fears about life's ending are multifaceted. They consist of fears about the process of aging, the prospect of one's own dying and one's own death, and the fact that our lives and activities — as they are lived within the confines of our corporeal bodies — will come to an inevitable end.There are also problems and anxieties concerned with the fact that the passage of time and the visible effects it leaves on our physical selves make us conscious that, at some time or other, we are, like other material objects, subject to decay and wearing down. The process is a great equalizer and no one who lives long enough is spared the spectacle of witnessing and experiencing the gradual process of the decline of their physical powers and of their cognitive functions. No matter what sort of life has been led, the ending of that particular life is certain.In this paper I want to discuss some views about the nature of these fears about the later stages of life, aging, old age and death and their roots in the philosophical and metaphysical views we have come to endorse. (shrink)

In a justifiably famous passage in Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates discusses whether or not the truly wicked, those who perpetrate injustices against humankind, can be happy. This issue has been the subject of countless commentaries by moral philosophers. In the end, Socrates comes to the reassuring conclusion that the unjust cannot really be happy.It is well known of course that Socrates argues for what is called by one writer “the supreme crowning paradox” of Socratic ethics: Socrates makes the case that the (...) worst thing that can happen to a person is that he or she should commit some terrible wrong and escape the corrective influence of justice. This supremely paradoxicalsounding insight is important not only for what it tells us about Socratic thinking on ethical matters, but more importantly because of the way that the conclusion that Socrates desperately wants to draw — that the perpetrators of injustice are miserable and ultimately suffer — is one that has stimulated moral inquiry. It has led to the search by many philosophers for a master argument which might show that whatever lure immorality might have for us, it is not only bad for us, but it is ultimately irrational for us to be unjust.If shown, a persuasive argument for the ultimate irrationality of injustice would be a powerful argument for encouraging the motivation to justice and morality, however onerous the commitment to the moral conventions of our society might be. Such an argument must show that whatever might be the lure of perpetrating injustice, it is an illusion which rational argumentation can show. (shrink)

PETER GARDENFORS, Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1988. viii + 262 pp. £24.75.

A developmental study of free-classification behavior within the age range of 3-1/2 to 19 years indicates that categorical responses, which are characteristic of adult behavior, increase with age while overgeneralized responses, classifications including noncategorical instances, decrease with age. Overdiscriminated responses which are incomplete categorical classifications increase from 3-1/2 to 6 years and then decrease to 19 years of age. These results are discussed within a two-stage theory of conceptual development (Kendler, 1971).